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Int J Geriatr Psychiatry. 2018;1–9.Objective: We tested whether people with dementia manifest selective forgetting
for self‐threatening information, the mnemic neglect effect (MNE). This selective for-
getting is observed among healthy adults in the recall, but not the recognition, of self‐
threatening feedback.
Methods: Sixty‐four statements about dementia were rated for their level of nega-
tivity by 280 staff and students at University of the West of England. The 12 state-
ments rated as most negative and the 12 statements rated as least negative were
then read to 62 people with dementia. Participants were randomized to 1 of 2 condi-
tions with the statements referring either to self or to another person. High‐negativity
and self‐referent statements had strong threat potential. Participants recalled the
statements and then completed a recognition task, which consisted of the 24 previ-
ously read statements and 24 new statements.
Results: Participants manifested the MNE: They recalled fewer high‐negativity (com-
paredwith low‐negativity) statements, but only when these referred to the self rather than
another person. This patternoccurred independently of levels of depressionor anxiety. Par-
ticipants also made more self‐protective intrusion errors when the statements referred to
the self than another person. Participants did not differ in their recognition of statements.
Conclusion: The MNE occurs among people with dementia. The selective forgetting
of highly negative, self‐referent statements serves to protect the self against the
threat that dementia represents. Given the similarities between the MNE and the clin-
ical phenomenon of repression, the findings may mark psychological processes that
are implicated in the acceptance (or lack thereof) of a dementia diagnosis.
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Dementia is a syndrome caused by a cluster of illnesses, the most com-
mon of which is the Alzheimer disease. All forms of dementia are char-
acterized by the progressive and gradual deterioration of cognitive- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
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tric Psychiatry Published by John Wabilities, although the nature and severity of these deficits differ
depending on the specific diagnosis. Alzheimer disease is marked by
progressive impairment in episodic memory, manifesting as forgetting,
as well as problems with recognition and language. Other forms of
dementia include dementia with Lewy bodies, associated with visual- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
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Key points
• The mnemic neglect effect (MNE) involves selective
forgetting of information that threatens the self. The
MNE occurs among healthy adults, but it is not known
whether MNE occurs among people with dementia.
• Sixty‐two people examined with mild dementia recalled
24 dementia‐related statements that we experimentally
varied whether the statements (1) referred either to the
self or another person and which (2) were high or low in
negativity.
• Participants manifested the MNE: They recalled fewer
high‐negativity statements when these statements
referred to the self than another person. Recall of low
negativity statements was not affected by whether
these statements referred to the self or another person.
• The MNE occurs for people who are living with
dementia. Selective forgetting of highly negative and
self‐referent (dementia‐related) information serves to
protect the self against threat.
2 CHESTON ET AL.hallucinations, and frontotemporal dementia, associated with poor
executive function (eg, decision making and planning).
Although some dementia symptoms can be treated, there is no
cure. As dementia progresses, not only do symptoms worsen, but they
also become widespread, so that ultimately almost all domains of an
individual's functioning are impaired. The personal consequences of
this global decline include increasing difficulty in performing many
activities that are taken for granted in everyday life, a cumulative
dependency on others, and profound changes in social relationships.
A common theme across psychological approaches to dementia
has been to position it as a threat to the self1-3 or to facets of the self,
such as well‐being4-6 and relationships.7-9 If dementia represents a
threat to the self, then the social psychological literature on self‐pro-
tection, that is, on psychological mechanisms that underlie the pro-
cessing and recall of self‐threatening information (eg, negative
feedback), are likely to be relevant in understanding how people with
dementia respond to the most threatening aspects of it.
A prominent theoretical formulation of feedback processing and
recall is the mnemic neglect model. At the heart of this model is the
mnemic neglect effect (MNE), which is defined as selective forgetting
of self‐threatening feedback.10 Specifically, participants recall poorly
experimenter‐provided feedback (in the form of statements or behav-
iours they are likely to enact) that is self‐threatening compared with
feedback that is not so. Although participants encode both types of
feedback, they process self‐threatening (compared with non–self‐
threatening) feedback in a relatively shallow manner, which in turn
impedes retrieval. However, initial encoding of the feedback is suffi-
ciently strong to ensure good recognition of it—both self‐threatening
and non–self‐threatening. In addition, recognition is dissociated from
recall: Whereas the former refers to a discrimination task that is
largely based on feelings of familiarity, the latter involves the con-
scious retrieval of details from memory.11
The MNE has been robustly observed in laboratory and naturalis-
tic settings.10
It functions to protect the self. That is, participants engage in
selective forgetting in an attempt to protect the self from the psycho-
logical discomfort that self‐threatening information entails. People
with dementia often come across information related to their illness,
much of which may well threaten their sense of self. It is possible,
therefore, that they exhibit the MNE for dementia‐related informa-
tion. This is the research question we addressed in the current study.
We reasoned that dementia‐related information can be a potent
source of self‐threat. Self‐threat, though, will vary. In particular,
dementia‐related information may range from high to low on negativ-
ity. High‐negativity information is diagnostic or accurate of the illness
and emphasizes the serious consequences of it for well‐being
(eg, “The illness means that you may forget the names of friends or
family” and “As the illness gets worse, so you will increasingly come
to rely on others”), whereas low‐negativity information is relatively
nondiagnostic of the illness and refers largely to encouraging or
manageable consequences of it for well‐being (eg, “People with your
illness can be distracted away from their problems” and “The illness
means you will still be able to learn to do new activities”). Further,
dementia‐related information may refer to one's self (eg, when pro-
vided directly by a medical practitioner during an assessment) or toanother person (eg, when contained in a pamphlet or dispensed
generically by a medical practitioner). Thus, the most threatening
dementia‐related information includes aspects of the illness that are
highly negative and refer to one's self.
We adopted an exploratory approach to addressing whether the
MNE will be observed among people with dementia. According to
the mnemic neglect model, the MNE will emerge in the case of self‐
threatening (vs non–self‐threatening) dementia‐related feedback:
People with dementia, in an act of self‐protection, will recall poorly
self‐threatening (compared with non–self‐threatening) information.
Alternatively, it is possible that people with dementia, given the
salience of their symptoms and the prevalence of changes in their
lifestyle, will be hypervigilant12,13 toward new and threatening
dementia‐related information. As such, they will process such infor-
mation deeply and recall it relatively well: The MNE will be reversed
(or at least cancelled out).
We tested a sample of 62 people with dementia. We presented
them with 24 dementia‐related statements that varied in level of neg-
ativity (high vs low). For half of participants, the statements referred to
the self (self‐referent), whereas for the other half, they referred to a
hypothetical gender‐neutral person named Chris. (In the rare cases
where the participant, a relative, or friend was named Chris, we
changed the hypothetical person's name to the gender‐neutral name
Jo.) We also assessed participants' levels of depression and anxiety.
Subsequently, we instructed participants to recall the 24 statements
and then recognize them (in comparison with a new set of 24 state-
ments). Evidence for the MNE would be obtained, if participants
recalled poorly the threatening (ie, high‐negativity, self‐referent) state-
ments, controlling for levels of depression and anxiety. As per prior
research on the mnemic neglect model,10 we did not expect differ-
ences in recognition.
TABLE 1 Descriptive statistics
Self (n = 31)
Mean (SD)
Other (n = 31)
Mean (SD)
Age 80.94 (7.77) 79.28 (7.01)
Cognitive Level
• MoCA 18.44 (2.79) 20.27 (2.39)
• ACE‐III 75.67 (8.47) 78.75 (6.63)
• M‐ACE 25.00 (3.16) 25.80 (1.81)
Anxiety (GAI) 2.36 (3.45) 2.48 (3.30)
Depression (GDS) 2.65 (1.94) 2.35 (2.16)
Diagnosis
• Alzheimer 17 24
• Vascular 8 4
• Mixed 6 3
Gender
• Men 18 12
• Women 13 19
Living status
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2.1 | Materials
We generated 64 descriptive statements of dementia from material
widely available within the United Kingdom (eg, information leaflets
published by the Alzheimer's Society and the National Health Service
[NHS] Choices website*) and intended to be read by people with
dementia. Two hundred eighty staff and students from University of
the West of England responded to an online Qualtrics survey (www.
qualtrics.com) and made 2 ratings of each statement (1 = not at all,
6 = extremely) according to (1) how diagnostic of dementia it was
and (2) the extent to which it reflected serious consequences of
dementia for well‐being. As responses to the 2 questions were posi-
tively correlated (Appendix A), we combined them into an index. This
enabled us to select the 12 statements with the highest scores (high
negativity) and the 12 statements with the lowest scores (low negativ-
ity; Appendix A).• With spouse 21 25
• Alone 7 5
• With family 3 1
Abbreviations: GAI, Geriatric Anxiety Inventory; GDS, Geriatric Depression
Scale. Depending on recruitment site, we used the following cognitive
screening tasks: the Montreal Cognitive Assessment or MoCA (n = 20),
the Addenbrooke's Cognitive Examination III or ACE‐III (n = 28), and the
Mini‐Addenbrooke's Cognitive Examination or M‐ACE (n = 14).2.2 | Participants and design
Between February and October 2015, we recruited 70 people with
dementia from 3 sites in the South West of England: 2 NHS Mental
Health Trusts and 1 independent memory clinic for NHS patients
(Table 1, Figure 1).† Participants were eligible to take part, if a diagno-
sis of probable vascular dementia,14 Alzheimer disease,15 or mixed
dementia (based on clinical judgements of the psychiatric or medical
teams) had been made within the previous 18 months.‡ All partici-
pants had mild levels of cognitive impairment, as demonstrated by
scores on cognitive screening tests completed during the previous
3 months. Depending on the site from which participants were
recruited, these were a cut‐off score of 1316 on the Montreal
Cognitive Assessment,17 a cut‐off score of 5018 on the Addenbrooke's
Cognitive Examination III,19 and a minimum score of 15 on the
Mini‐Addenbrooke's Cognitive Examination.20 Participants were also
assessed by a member of their clinical team as having the capacity
to consent to take part in the study.
We used a 2 (negativity: high, low) × 2 (referent: self, other) mixed
design, with the first independent variable being within subjects and
the second being between subjects. We randomly assigned partici-
pants to the levels of the between‐subjects variable, self‐referent
and other‐referent.2.3 | Measures
We measured anxiety with the Geriatric Anxiety Inventory21 (a 20‐
item self‐report questionnaire designed to assess levels of anxiety in*http://www.nhs.uk/Conditions/dementia‐guide/Pages/dementia‐choices.aspx.
†The trial was granted NHS Research Ethics Committee approval on December
18, 2014 (14/SW/1142), with two major amendments approved subsequently
(April 15, 2015, for home visits and November 13, 2015, for recruitment of
study 2 participants). The study received approval from the University of the
West of England Faculty of Health and Social Sciences ethics committee on
February 13, 2015 (HAS/15/02/113).
‡All participants consented to allow access to medical records that included
details of recent cognitive assessments.an older population) and depression with the 15‐item Geriatric
Depression Scale.22 People with dementia who had either a significant
history of premorbid psychiatric problems or were anxious/depressed
(more than 3 standard deviations above the mean and exceeding clin-
ical cut‐off points for severe levels of anxiety or depression) were not
eligible for inclusion. Figure 1 provides a flow chart of participant
recruitment. In the other‐referent condition, 3 participants withdrew
from the study after allocation, with a fourth participant being
excluded due to extremely high levels of anxiety (15 or higher of a
maximum score of 20 on the Geriatric Anxiety Inventory) and depres-
sion (12 of 15 on the Geriatric Depression Scale). A further 4 partici-
pants completed the recall but not the recognition task. In the self‐
referent condition, one participant withdrew before completing the
recall task, with 2 others being withdrawn due to high levels of anxiety
and depression. Also, one participant completed the recall but not the
recognition task. Finally, a protocol violation by the on‐site researcher
assistant (ie, the participant was allocated to the other‐referent condi-
tion, but the case record form suggested that the participant was
treated as being in the self‐referent condition) led to the removal of
this participant's data from analyses. Consequently, we entered data
from 62 participants into the recall analysis and from 57 participants
into the recognition analysis.
2.4 | Procedure
We followed closely (but see below) the standard mnemic neglect pro-
tocol validated in prior studies with healthy adults.23,24§ Participants§The trial protocol was registered online (Current Controlled Trials
ISRCTN30485698).
FIGURE 1 Flow chart for participant recruitment
4 CHESTON ET AL.were tested by research assistants (3 female, 1 male). The research
assistants were blinded to participant condition allocation until after
the consent procedure. In the self‐referent condition, participants
were instructed to “Imagine that these descriptions relate to you,”
whereas in the other‐referent condition, they were instructed to
“Imagine that the descriptions relate to a person named Chris.” The
wording of the 24 statements varied slightly depending on whether
they were self‐referent (eg, “The impact of the illness depends on your
emotional resilience”) or other‐referent (“The impact of the illness
depends on Chris' emotional resilience”). The order in which state-
ments were read was identical in the self‐referent and other‐referent
conditions.
To accommodate participants' reduced cognitive capacity, we
made 2 changes to the standard mnemic neglect protocol.25,26 First,
instead of presenting participants with a continuous stream of state-
ments, the research assistants read out the statements in 4 sets of 6,
with each set containing 3 high‐negativity and 3 low‐negativity state-
ments. Second, instead of positioning the free recall task after all of
the 24 statements had been read out, the research assistants asked
participants to recall as many statements as possible at the end of
each set of 6 statements.Next, participants completed a recognition task. The research
assistants read aloud 48 statements comprising 24 “old” statements
(those that participants had already heard) and 24 “new” statements
(ones that participants had not previously heard and which we derived
from the list of statements that had initially been rated for negativity).
We include the new statements in Appendix B. Participants were then
asked whether or not they had heard each statement read to them.
Finally, participants were offered a mood repair session (watching a
brief comedy video) before finally being debriefed.3 | RESULTS
3.1 | Recall
We coded the recalled statements on the basis of a predefined gist cri-
terion, in which we counted statements as correctly recalled if the text
conveyed their general meaning.25,26 For example, the statement “The
illness can make X feel depressed” would be counted as correct, if
there was a reference to being depressed or sad, or grieving or upset.
We entered the number of statements recalled into a 2 (negativ-
ity: high, low) × 2 (referent: self, other) analysis of variance. The
mnemic neglect model predicts an interaction between negativity
and referent: Recall will be lower when the high‐negativity (vs low‐
negativity) statements refer to the self rather than other. Indeed, this
interaction was significant (F1,60 = 5.36, P = .024). Participants recalled
high‐negativity statements poorly when these statements referred to
them (M = 2.42, SD = 1.43) rather than to Chris (M = 3.26, SD = 1.53;
t60 = −2.23, P = .029, d = 0.57). However, participants did not differ in
their recall of low‐negativity statements referring either to them
(M = 1.74, SD = 1.51) or to Chris (M = 1.52, SD = 1.29; t60 = 0.64,
P = .53, d = −0.16). The MNE thus emerged among people with
dementia for dementia‐related statements. Moreover, this interaction
remained significant after controlling for (ie, entering in the analyses as
covariates) depression (Finteraction1;59 = 5.03, P = .029) and anxiety
(Finteraction1;59 = 5.475, P = .023). Finally, we obtained a significant main
effect for negativity (F1,60 = 27.67, P < .001): Overall, participants
manifested better recall for high‐negativity (M = 2.84, SD = 1.53) than
low‐negativity (M = 1.63, SD = 1.40) statements. There was no main
effect for referent (F1,60 = 1.16, P = .286).3.2 | Intrusion errors
Participants made a total of 36 repetition errors (ie, recalling a state-
ment twice) and valence reversal errors. A valence reversal error was
defined as one in which the recalled statement reversed or negated
the meaning of the original statement that had been read aloud. For
example, instead of the low‐negativity, other‐referent statement “the
illness doesn't mean that Chris has to stop doing the things that they
enjoy,” one participant recalled “the illness may interfere with things
Chris wants to do.” Similarly, instead of the high‐negativity, self‐
referent statement “your illness is a progressive disease,” another
participant recalled “the illness does not mean that I will get
progressively worse.” The total combined number of repetition and
valence reversal errors amounted to 11.50% of overall recall,
CHESTON ET AL. 5approximately double the rate observed among healthy adults in
laboratory experiments.24 The unusually high rate of intrusion errors
led us to initiate a supplemental analysis that also tests the mnemic
neglect model, uniquely so among people with dementia.
If the MNE is in the service of self‐protection, then this will be
reflected in the type of intrusion errors. Following previous research,27
we categorized such errors as either self‐protective (ie, valence reversal
of high‐negativity statements and repetition of low‐negativity state-
ments) or non–self‐protective (valence reversal of low‐negativity state-
ments and repetition of high‐negativity statements). We then
compared the proportion of each type of intrusion error that partici-
pants made in the 2 referent conditions. We hypothesized that, if
intrusion errors act to protect the self, then we would observe more
self‐protective errors (and fewer non–self‐protective error) in the
self‐referent (than other‐referent) condition. There was no significant
difference between the self‐referent (n = 15, 41.67% of all intrusion
errors) and other‐referent (n = 21, 58.33% of all intrusion errors) con-
ditions in terms of the overall number of intrusion error, x21 = 1.00,
P = .317. However, a chi‐square analysis yielded a significant associa-
tion between referent and intrusion error type, x21 = 5.60, P = .018.
Participants made a higher number of self‐protective (n = 11,
73.33% of self‐referent intrusion errors) than non–self‐protective
(n = 4, 26.67% of self‐referent intrusion errors) errors in the self‐refer-
ent condition but made a lower number of self‐protective (n = 7,
33.33% of other‐referent intrusion errors) than non–self‐protective
(n = 14, 66.67% of other‐referent intrusion errors) errors in the
other‐referent condition. This pattern of results reinforces the claim
that the MNE is in the service of self‐protection among people with
dementia.3.3 | Recognition
Following prior research,24 we used signal detection theory to analyse
the recognition data. To take account for biases in responding, as
would occur, for example, if a participant identified all 48 items as
having been in the original list of words that was read out, we calculated
a discrimination index (d1) by subtracting the ratio of false positives
(or false alarms) from the ratio of correct positive responses
(or hits). We entered the discrimination index scores into a 2 (high/low
negativity) × 2 (self‐referent/other‐referent) analysis of variance. As
expected, the interaction was not significant (F1,54 = 0.47, P = .49).
No other effect was significant (Table 2).4 | SUMMARY OF RESULTS
The MNE emerged among people with dementia: They manifested
selective forgetting for self‐threatening (ie, high‐negativity, self‐TABLE 2 Mean discrimination index scores (d1) for recognition as a





Self (n = 30) 0.18 (0.18) 0.17 (0.12)
Other (n = 27) 0.19 (0.18) 0.21 (0.25)referent) statements compared with non–self‐threatening (ie, low‐
negativity, other‐referent) statements, regardless of their levels of
depression or anxiety. The results pattern is consistent with the argu-
ment that the MNE is in the service of self‐protection for people who
live with dementia. Another result—pertaining to intrusion errors—is
also consistent with this argument. Participants in the self‐referent
(vs other‐referent) condition were more likely to reverse the valence
of high‐negativity statements and to repeat low‐negativity statements.
Finally, as in prior relevant literature,24 recognition patterns did not
differ. Although participants recalled fewer high‐negativity statements
referring to themselves than Chris, their recognition of these state-
ments was equivalent, thereby indicating that all statements were
encoded.5 | CONCLUSIONS
We presented participants with dementia‐related statements that var-
ied on negativity. Also, we kept the information content constant
among participants while manipulating the referent; that is, some par-
ticipants were read and recalled information that referred to the self,
whereas others were read and recalled identical information that
pertained to another person. These methodological strengths are
uniquely suited to testing the mnemic neglect model.
The model states that self‐threatening (relative to non–self‐
threatening) information is processed shallowly and recalled poorly,24
a phenomenon labelled the MNE. This phenomenon has been robustly
observed among healthy adults. However, it was not clear whether it
would be present among persons with dementia. On the one hand,
such persons may find highly negative statements about dementia
threatening and thus process this information shallowly and recall it
poorly. On the other hand, they may be vigilant toward highly nega-
tive, dementia‐related information and hence process it deeply and
recall it well. We conducted the first investigation on the topic to find
out.
The results indicated that the MNE occurs among people with
dementia. They recalled poorly dementia‐related information when it
was self‐threatening, that is, when it was highly negative and referred
to them. However, they recalled dementia‐related information rela-
tively well when it was non–self‐threatening, that is, when it was
low on negativity and referred to another person. This pattern of
selective recall aligns with the assertion that the MNE serves to guard
the self against threat.24 We obtained additional evidence that partic-
ipants engaged in information processing that is likely to reduce threat
to the self. In particular, they committed more self‐protective intru-
sions (ie, valence reversals of high‐negativity statements and repeti-
tions of low‐negativity statements) than non–self‐protective
intrusions (valence reversals of low‐negativity statements and repeti-
tions of high‐negativity statements). Yet recognition patterns did not
differ for self‐threatening versus non–self‐threatening information, a
finding that is consistent with the mnemic neglect model.
Our findings of the MNE for recall, but not recognition, are con-
sistent with the dementia literature,28,29 which suggests that people
living with Alzheimer disease who do not explicitly acknowledge their
illness often evince implicit awareness of it.30 In one study, for
6 CHESTON ET AL.example, people with early dementia took longer to read dementia‐
related words than neutral words matched for frequency and syllable
length.31 However, although in that study the threat posed by the
dementia‐related words was indirect, the statements in our study
were self‐referent and the level of self‐threat was manipulated.
It has been suggested that the memory impairments characteristic
of dementia result in a failure to update personal information and thus
contribute to a “petrified self.”32 In contrast, our findings suggest that
self‐protection is not only due exclusively to memory impairments
caused by neural deficits but is also due to psychosocial processes
related to the level of self‐threat. Qualitative analyses of the narra-
tives of people living with dementia suggest that, for many, accep-
tance of the diagnosis poses a dilemma33,34: confronting their
dementia directly at the risk of increased distress or retreating away
from it at the risk of losing control. Some people with dementia appear
to resolve this dilemma by exploring the more threatening aspects of
dementia indirectly, through stories and metaphors.35,36 This indirect
exploration may decrease self‐threat in a similar way as the other‐ref-
erent statements did in our study. Within a clinical context, therefore,
the differential recall of self‐referent versus other‐referent dementia‐
related statements can be understood as a proxy measure of the
acceptance of a dementia diagnosis. As such, our investigation may
constitute an alternative way of exploring whether the acceptance
of a dementia diagnosis is influenced by psychological mechanisms
related to self‐protection.5.1 | Study limitations
We derived the ratings of dementia‐related statements on self‐threat
from University of the West of England staff and undergraduate stu-
dents rather than from people with dementia, because we wanted to
avoid the risk of distressing the latter population. Of course, we can-
not rule out the possibility that people with dementia might have
rated the statements somewhat differently than university staff and
students. However, we have reasons to be confident in the validity
of the obtained ratings. Firstly, staff and students were familiar with
dementia. As our informal observations suggested, many staff mem-
bers completed the survey because of personal interest in dementia
and frequently because their lives had been affected by dementia
(due to an association with a relative or friend). Also, students
attended dedicated sessions on neurological conditions, including
various forms of dementia, given that psychology across the lifespan
in prominent throughout the Psychology programme at University of
the West of England. Secondly, the results of the study validated the
ratings; that is, the statements rated as highly negative were recalled
poorly (when coupled with self‐reference).
The attrition rate was high relative to mnemic neglect studies with
healthy adults. This included 5 participants completing the recall task
but withdrawing from the recognition task. One contributory factor
may have been the semantic similarities between some of the recall
statements and some of the (novel) recognition statements. For exam-
ple, the recall statement “The illness doesn't mean that X has to stop
doing the things that X enjoys” is similar to the novel recognition task
statement “With the illness there is still much that X can enjoy in life.”
This similarity may have rendered the recognition task difficult andthus discouraged further participation. Again, we are confident in
our findings. This attrition was limited to 5 participants, and the
null results on recognition mimicked those of results obtained with
healthy adults.
5.2 | Study implications
Our findings have both clinical and empirical implications. On a clinical
level, we selected our statements about dementia from information
leaflets that are widely available in the United Kingdom and intended
to be read by people who live with dementia. In our study, recall of
some statements was improved when they referred to another person
than the self. This finding suggests that information in such leaflets will
be recalled better when self‐threat is reduced, that is, when the state-
ments refer to another person (eg, the general or average other). Addi-
tionally, previous research has established that the MNE is cancelled
out under various circumstances, such as when the threatening infor-
mation is relayed by a close friend (rather than a stranger),37 whenmoti-
vation for self‐improvement is strong (rather than weak),38 when the
threatening information pertains to aspects of one's self that are mod-
ifiable (vs fixed),38 and when the self is bolstered (via self‐esteem induc-
tion) prior to the delivery of threatening information.25 Extrapolating
from these findings, dementia researchers may consider devising situa-
tions that are likely to improve the recall of threatening information. For
example, nostalgic recall (relative to control) bolsters the self by aug-
menting psychological resources (eg, self‐esteem) in both nonclinical
populations39 and people living with dementia.40 Consequently, we
expect that, following an induction of nostalgia, participants will be
more likely to recall self‐referent high‐negativity information about
dementia. We intend to test this hypothesis in a future study.
In conclusion, our research showed that people living with
dementia exhibit selective amnesia for threatening information, that
is, highly negative and self‐referent information pertaining to their ill-
ness. As such, our findings contribute to the understanding of memory
processes in people with dementia and, by implication, of psychologi-
cal mechanisms underlying the acceptance of a diagnosis of dementia.
We hope our findings spark additional investigations on the topic.
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Dementia‐related statements (recall task)Statement N
Correlation Between




The symptoms that X may experience can include loss of memory 249 rs = 0.44
P < .001
5.26 (0.79)
X's illness is a progressive disease 248 rs = 0.61
P < .001
5.12 (0.94)
The illness means that X may forget the names of friends or family 249 rs = 0.38
P < .001
5.06 (0.92)
As the illness gets worse, so X will increasingly come to rely on others 254 rs = 0.46
P < 0.001
5.03 (0.91)
The illness means that X's symptoms will tend to become more severe 267 rs = 0.61
P < .001
5.02 (0.92)
The symptoms that X may experience can include problems with communication 273 rs = 0.54
P < .001
4.98 (0.87)
The illness may make X feel confused at times 246 rs = 0.48
P < .001
4.96 (0.87)
The illness can make X feel depressed 259 rs = 0.53
P < .001
4.87 (0.97)
The illness may make X feel insecure 249 rs = 0.56
P < .001
4.87 (0.99)
The illness will mean that X cannot always remember things you/they have heard 260 rs = 0.42
P < .001
4.83 (0.90)
As a result of the illness X may misinterpret the world around you/them 250 rs = 0.52
P < .001
4.79 (1.00)




The illness doesn't mean that X has to stop doing the things that X enjoys 280 rs = 0.11
P = .064
3.71 (1.11)
People with X's illness can be distracted away from their problems 246 rs = 0.25
P < .001
3.64 (1.16)
Even with the illness X can be reassured 249 rs = 0.26
P < .001
3.60 (1.20)
The illness develops when the arteries in X's brain become blocked 269 rs = 0.54
P < .001
3.59 (1.48)
The illness does not change who you are/X is 282 rs = 0.36
P < .001
3.53 (1.54)
In the illness proteins can gradually build‐up inside X's brain 250 rs = 0.67
P < .001
3.52 (1.48)
When diagnosed with the illness it helps if X has a high quality of life 247 rs = 0.52
P < .001
3.44 (1.43)
The illness is caused by a shortage of important chemicals in X's brain 242 rs = 0.59
P < .001
3.37 (1.39)
With the illness, X will still be able to find answers for yourself/themselves 252 rs = 0.13
P = .040
3.33 (1.07)
The illness means X will still able to learn to do new activities 249 rs = 0.15
P = .017
3.23 (1.10)
The impact of the illness depends on X's emotional resilience 247 rs = 0.42
P < .001
3.13 (1.29)
The illness may make X fidget constantly 246 rs = 0.55
P < .001
3.13 (1.27)
X refers to either self (ie, “You”) or other (ie, “Chris”).
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New dementia‐related statements (included in
recognition task)Statement N
Correlation Between
Responses to 2 Questions
Mean of Combined
Ratings (SD)
The illness can sometimes quickly get worse for X 254 rs = 0.513
P < .001
4.71 (1.05)
The chances of X developing the illness increases with age 267 rs = 0.358
P < .001
4.61 (1.01)
X may forget and carry out the same activity twice 261 rs = 0.411
P < .001
4.53 (0.97)
The illness may mean that X forgets where X has put something 248 rs = 0.373
P < .001
4.50 (1.00)
The illness occurs when X's brain is affected by a disease 281 rs = 0.693
P < .001
4.48 (1.43)
The illness means X may forget and ask the same questions over and over 259 rs = 0.276
P < .001
4.47 (0.96)
With the illness X will notice that X sometimes lose track of what X is saying 255 rs = 0.506
P < .001
4.30 (1.03)
The impact of the illness depends on the support available to X 254 rs = 0.569
P < .001
4.26 (1.25)
X may not notice the early signs of the illness 248 rs = 0.253
P < .001
4.22 (1.15)
The symptoms of X's illness can vary greatly from one person to another 251 rs = 0.376
P < .001
4.22 (1.15)
The illness can be caused by very small strokes resulting in X's brain being damaged 253 rs = 0.603
P < .001
4.21 (1.42)
The illness begins gradually with very minor changes for X 274 rs = 0.176
P = .003
4.14 (1.00)
The illness may mean that X may wake in the middle of the night and get dressed 275 rs = 0.494
P < .001
4.03 (1.17)
As a result of the illness X may find it difficult to sleep 251 rs = 0.617
P < .001
3.97 (1.23)
Someone with X's illness may be restless at night 248 rs = 0.596
P < .001
3.97 (1.18)
The illness may affect X's body clock so that X wakes up in the night 250 rs = 0.527
P < .001
3.96 (1.18)
Some people with a similar type of illness to X's benefit from medication 258 rs = 0.316
P < .001
3.85 (1.16)
Memory aids such as a diary can be very helpful for X 256 rs = 0.307
P < .001
3.82 (1.28)
Drug treatments may slow down the speed at which X's symptoms get worse 282 rs = 0.283
P < .001
3.79 (1.15)
Someone with X's illness may feel stressed by too much noise 248 rs = 0.587
P < .001
3.79 (1.23)
Early symptoms of the illness are often mild for X 251 rs = 0.175
P = .005
3.75 (1.09)
With the illness X will be able to recall things that happened in the past 249 rs = 0.136
P = .032
3.75 (1.18)
With the illness there is still much that X can enjoy in life 281 rs = 0.113
P = .059
3.71 (1.13)
People with X's illness can remain independent for as long as possible 260 rs = 0.041
P < .513
3.71 (1.04)
X refers to either self (ie, “You”) or other (ie, “Chris”).
